Pairwise linear discriminant analysis can be regarded as a process to generate rankings of the populations. But in general, not all rankings are generated. We give a characterization of generated rankings. We also derive some basic properties of this model.
Introduction
Consider the problem of linear discriminant analysis among m normal populations in R n with equal covariance matrices: N n (µ i , Σ), i = 1, 2, . . . , m. We assume that Σ is known, and deal with the canonical case Σ = I (the identity matrix). In each pairwise comparison of populations, Fisher's discriminant hyperplane in this setting is just the bisector of the line segment connecting the means of the two populations in question, and so the nearer population in the Euclidean distance is selected (Muirhead (1982) , Seber (1984) ). Here, we are identifying the populations with their means. Thus, Fisher's linear discriminant rule among these m populations takes the following form: Allocate a test sample point x ∈ R n to the nearest population.
But we often have an interest not only in the most probable population but in the second most, the third most,..., and the mth most (or the least) probable populations. That is, we want to rank the m populations from the most probable to the least probable one. In such a case, Fisher's rule suggests the ranking rule according to the distances to the populations: the nearest population is ranked first, the second nearest ranked second, and so on.
In terms of the division of the sample space R n by discriminant hyperplanes, this rule is equivalent to the following. The whole R n is divided into regions by m(m − 1)/2 discriminant hyperplanes, and the order of distances to the populations is the same at all points in each such region. So each region can be indexed by the ranking determined by that order. Now the rule is: Give a test sample point the ranking which indexes the region where the point lies.
In this way, pairwise discriminant analysis can be regarded as a process to generate rankings among the m populations. However, unless the dimension n is large enough compared with the number of populations m, not all the m! rankings are generated. So the questions arise as to (Q-1) how many and (Q-2) what kind of rankings are generated.
Actually, the model discussed so far is also known as the ideal point model or the unfolding model, and is widely used in applied statistics such as psychometrics, marketing research, etc. (Carroll (1980) , Carroll and De Soete (1991) ).
Furthermore, many variants and generalizations of this model are devised and utilized for practical data analysis in those fields (DeSarbo and Hoffman (1987), Takane (1987 Takane ( , 1989a Takane ( , 1989b , Takane, Bozdogan and Shibayama (1987) ). However, although a lot of effort has been put into the development of this model for practical purposes, theoretical investigation does not seem to have been much conducted.
Moreover, in social choice theory, this model has been common under the name Euclidean preferences. One can avoid voting cycles (known as Condorcet's paradox) or escape the dictatorship conclusion of Arrow's impossibility theorem by assuming some similarity of preferences across society (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)). Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) assume Euclidean preferences as a restriction on individual preferences, and, with some restriction on the distribution of preferences, establish the existence of a super-majority winner.
The essential feature of Euclidean preferences to their results is the division of R n by hyperplanes, and generalization to "intermediate preferences" (Grandmont (1978) ) or "linear preferences" (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991a)) is possible from this perspective; see Nalebuff (1988, 1991a) . However, in spite of its considerable significance, this model has not been studied deeply enough in the social choice literature either. For instance, concerning (Q-1) above, Nalebuff (1988, 1991b) Recently, Takemura (1997, 2000) began to study theoretical questions about this model, and gave a complete answer to question (Q-1) by using the theory of hyperplane arrangements. But the second question (Q-2) is much more difficult, and they gave only a partial answer.
By finding a characterization of generated rankings, the present paper provides a complete answer to (Q-2), in the sense that for each ranking we can easily determine whether it is a) generated as an unbounded region, b) generated as a bounded region, or c) not generated. Also, this characterization will be used to provide another derivation of the answer to (Q-1), i.e., the formula for the number of generated rankings. Moreover, the paper derives a number of basic properties of the model. For example, it is shown that a "neutral" population can never be ranked last.
The distinction between Takemura (1997, 2000) and the present paper is as follows: In Takemura (1997, 2000) , we embedded the sample space R n in R m−1 -the "right" space in the sense that it is the smallest space where all m! rankings are generated; in the present paper, on the other hand, we embed R n in R n+1 , and this makes central arrangements serve as a building block in the study of non-central arrangements in R n .
Throughout the paper, we make extensive use of the theory of hyperplane arrangements. Application of hyperplane arrangements to probability and statistics may also be found in Brown and Diaconis (1998) and Bidigare, Hanlon and Rockmore (1999). For the theory of hyperplane arrangements, the reader is referred to the excellent book by Orlik and Terao (1992) . We use this book as a general reference for definitions and results concerning arrangements of hyperplanes. For basic concepts about lattices and order, Davey and Priestley (2002) is a nice introduction.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define several concepts used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we derive main results of this paper. Specifically, we give a complete characterization of generated rankings.
In addition, using this result on the characterization of generated rankings, we
give another proof of the formulae for the numbers of various rankings in Kamiya and Takemura (1997, 2000) . In Section 4, we find some properties when there is a neutral population. In Section 5, we suggest a future direction of our research.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce several concepts needed in the paper.
Suppose we are given
We say that the vectors ν 1 , . . . , ν M are lumped together iff, when regarded as points in R N , they are contained in an open halfspace determined by a hyperplane passing through the origin:
That is, 
Then we know the following fact, which is an easy consequence of Farkas'
Lemma (Ziegler (1995) 
Main results
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions:
Assumptions.
We denote by (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m ) an ordering of {1, 2, . . . , m} in which i 1 is ranked first, i 2 is ranked second, and so on. When
is non-empty, we index this region by (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m ), and say that ordering
is generated. Moreover, we identify region (2) 
So we can say that the above indexing of regions is the one based on the ideal point model. As was explained We first note the following equivalences:
We Proof of (1) . does not arise in this case.
Next we have to show that the reverse ordering is not generated either. But this is obvious, since in this caseμ i+1
are also spread out.
This situation is illustrated by the upper part of Figure 2 . Q.E.D. Proof of (2-1).
there exists an x ∈ R n such that
For this
x n+1 > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1. Dividing both sides by
Thus we see that the region indexed by (1, 2, . . . , m) arises.
for any c ≥ 0 and any x 0 in the region. Hence, the region recedes in the direction of x = 0, and this proves that ordering (1, 2, . . . , m) arises as an unbounded region.
Finally, to see the reverse ordering also arises as an unbounded region, just
This case is illustrated by the middle part of Figure 2 . In Figure 2 , the thick arrow represents the horizontal direction of the halfspace. Q.E.D.
(2-2) There does not exist an open halfspace containing pointsμ
Or equivalently, the Proof of (2-2). Suppose there existedx = ( In the case of (2-2-1), ordering (1, 2, . . . , m) arises as a bounded region, whereas the reverse ordering does not arise.
Proof. In this case, there exists anx = (
Dividing both sides of this inequality by x n+1 , we find that ordering (1, 2, . . . , m)
arises in this case.
We move on to showing that the region indexed by (1, 2, . . . , m) is bounded.
Suppose to the contrary that the region in question is unbounded. Then, the closure of the region is a non-empty, unbounded polyhedral set. Thus this polyhedral set recedes in a certain direction x = 0: 
We claim that these inequalities are actually all equalities, for if there existed some i j satisfying (
< 0 for all sufficiently large c, in contradiction to (5). Hence we have
We will show that 
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1. But this contradicts the fact that µ i − µ i+1 , i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1, are spread out. In this way, we arrive at the conclusion that the region in question is bounded.
Finally, we prove that the reverse ordering is not generated. Suppose it were generated. Then there would exist anx = ( 
In the case of (2-2-2), ordering (1, 2, . . . , m) does not arise, while the reverse ordering arises as a bounded region.
Proof. In this case, there does not exist anx = (
satisfying (4) with x n+1 > 0, much less with x n+1 = 1. Hence, (1, 2, . . . , m) does not arise.
The proof of the fact that the reverse ordering arises as a bounded region is easy: Just notice that there exists anx = (
satisfying (4), and rewrite the left-hand side of (4) as (μ i+1 −μ i ) T (−x). Then we can apply case (2-2-1). Q.E.D.
The indeterminacy of the first n coordinates of the direction vectorx corresponds to the translation invariance of the discriminant analysis in R n . When we translate the origin by a so that
the problem remains the same. Therefore, it is natural that only the last coordinate ofx is related to the characterization of generation of rankings.
The considerations so far are summarized in 
x. But this condition can be written Consider the pairing of orderings which are reverse to each other. In the special case n = m − 2, at least one ordering in each pair arises: On the other hand, according to Theorem 3.1, the number of bounded regions is equal to the number of orderings for which (2-2-1) occurs, which in turn is equal to half the number of orderings for which (2-2) occurs. Now the number of orderings for which (2-2) happens is equal to the number of orderings for which (2) Finally, the number of all arising regions is given, of course, by the sum of the number of bounded regions and the number of unbounded ones.
Thus, we can express the numbers of regions in terms of the numbers of consistent orderings, which are given with the help of the following proposition. 
For Stirling numbers, see Pólya, Tarjan and Woods (1983) or Riordan (1978) .
The proof of Proposition 3.1 will be given in the Appendix.
By the argument preceding Proposition 3.1, the number of unbounded regions is
c(m, n).
Similarly, the number of bounded regions is
Adding these two numbers, we get the number of all regions as
In this way, we obtain the following corollary: (7), (8) and (9) in the Appendix.
A neutral population
In this section, we examine a particular case where we have a "neutral" alternative population. By specializing to this particular situation, we can find some more specific properties than were obtained in the preceding section.
Suppose there exists an i 0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} such that µ i0 is contained in the polytope spanned by the other
In this case, we will say µ i 0 is neutral among {µ 1 , . . . , µ m }. We begin by seeing that a neutral alternative can never be ranked last. 
the following inequality holds for each i ≤ m − 1 : As a simple corollary, we obtain a property concerning boundedness of Voronoi polyhedra. Recall that the Voronoi polyhedron associated with µ i0
is the set of points from which µ i0 is not farther than any other alternative
Sugihara (2000)). We have seen in Theorem 4.1 that a neutral alternative µ i 0 cannot be ranked last; we now show that when µ i 0 lies "deep inside" the polytope conv{µ i : i = i 0 }, it cannot be ranked even second last, third last, and so on. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3 . Denote the set of all vertices of a polytope P by vert(P ). 
This consideration implies that when µ i0 is neutral among Alt 1 , at least one alternative, µ j1 , is ranked lower than i 0 at an arbitrary x ∈ R n .
Repeat the argument above with Alt
Then we obtain the existence of
we can see that µ j 2 and µ j 1 are different.
Thus, at least two alternatives are ranked lower than i 0 . Q.E.D.
Actually, the proof of Theorem 4.2 contains the proof of Theorem 4.1, but the latter is based on the argument in the preceding section.
Evidently, continuing this process, we can obtain similar conditions which guarantee that orderings with i 0 in the last three, last four,..., positions are not generated.
In parallel with Corollary 4.1, we get the following corollary: In this paper we gave a complete characterization of generated rankings. This characterization allows us to easily determine which rankings are generated and which of the generated rankings have unbounded regions. In addition we investigated some properties of neutral alternatives. 
Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove Proposition 3.1.
By the argument just before Theorem 3.1, the desired number is equal to the number of generated orderings in the ideal vector model. Hence the problem is equivalent to that of counting the number of regions of the arrangement of hyperplanes A(m, N ) = {H ij : 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m}, where 
